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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
16783

-vsSELMAR RAY PURCELL,
Defendant-Appellant.

------- .
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was convicted of escape, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309 (1953),
as amended, for an escape from the Utah State Prison.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried before a jury and found guilty
on October 29, 1979, in the Third District Court, in and for
Salt Lake County, Utah, the Honorable Dean E. Conder, presiding.
He was sentenced to 1 to 15 years in the Utah State Prison, to
run consecutively with the sentence he was already serving.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the judgment
and sentence rendered by the trial court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Appellant asserted at trial through his own
testimony .and the testimony of other inmates that in the
early part of June, 1979 he was housed in medium security
at the Utah State Prison and was stabbed by two other
prison inmates (T.193,208,209,222).

After being stabbed,

appellant did not seek medical treatment from prison
officials; instead he treated the wounds himself with the
assistance of other inmates (T.194).

Appellant did not

file any grievance with the prison Warden, Program Director,
Board of Corrections or any other prison administrator, with
the exception of Al Chavez, a prison counselor, nor did
he ask to be placed in protective custody (T.225,233-235,
242-243).

Rather, sometime during the three weeks following

the attack, appellant merely requested that he be transferred
to minimum security (T.226).

The request was considered

by the block classification committee.

One of the members

of that committee was Mr. Chavez, the counselor to whom
appellant had reported the stabbing (T.233,234).

The request

was denied and appellant remained in medium security (T.227).

-2-
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Appellant testified at trial that while he
remained in medium security he was afraid of further
assaults (T.226,227,229).

He further testified that he

and his friend, Gary Harding, were threatened by other
inmates, and that reprisals would have been made if the
attack had been reported (T.224,237).
On June 24, 1979, appellant and two other inmates
escaped from the Utah State Prison (T.185,186,228).

The

escape occurred when appellant and Mr. Harding went into
a room at the prison to set up chairs for a meeting.

In

the room there was a third inmate, Delmont Gentry; however,
there were no other prisoners in the room at the time.

Mr. Gentry told appellant and Mr. Harding that the door
leading out of the prison had been left unlocked (T.186,
228,250).

Appellant and the other inmates left through

the door and effectuated their escape.

There was no evi-

dence presented at trial to indicate that at the time of the
escape appellant was being threatened with injury or that
there was an imminent threat of injury if he remained in
Prison.
Soon after the inmates escaped, officials at the
prison discovered their absence, and a search was initiated
(T.95).

All three inmates were apprehended about four
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hours after their escape (T.230) .,

Mr. Harding and Mr.

Gentry were apprehended at about 4000 West 3500 South in
Granger (T.123), and appellant was discovered by police
about one block north of that location hiding behind
some bushes in front of a church (T.124,260).

Appellant

testified that he hid from police out of "force of habit"
(T.266).

Mr. Harding testified that he intended to remain

out of prison until he was caught (T.252).

After the three

prisoners were arrested and processed they were returned
to maximum security at the prison (T.230).
At trial the judge made three rulings to which
appellant took exception.

First,

~he

trial judge refused

to grant appellant a continuance, which was sought in order
to secure the presence of Mr.

~havez

at trial to corroborate

appellant's testimony regarding the stabbing (T.256,275).
The basis of this ruling was that Mr. Chavez's testimony
would merely be cumulative (T.275).

Second, the trial judge

had stricken all evidence which pertained to appellant's
claimed defense of compulsion and refused to instruct the
jury on compulsion (T. 260,268).

Third, the trial judge,

towards the end of the final day of trial, had the court
room closed to the public on the basis of information that
he had received from the prison that appellant and the
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other two defendants were planning to escape (T.244,245,258).
A court official explained that he had received the information from a prison counselor, via the Murray Police
Department (T.258).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO
SUBMIT THE ISSUE OF COMPULSION TO
THE JURY.
Appellant has never contended that he did not
escape from prison.

However, he asserts that the trial

court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on his
claimed defense of compulsion.

The standard in determining

whether the defense of compulsion should be submitted to
a jury in escape cases varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
Respondent submits that under the facts of the case the
trial court appropriately refused to instruct on compulsion.
Traditionally, the defense of compulsion finds
application in situations where one commits a crime under
the threat that he will be physically harmed by a third
person if he refuses to act.

In the instant case, appellant

escaped from the Utah State Prison three to four weeks
after he had allegedly been stabbed by other inmates (T. 193,
208,209,222).

At the time of appellant's escape he was
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not beinq threatened with imminent injury if he refused
to escape.

Therefore, the defense of compulsion should

be unavailable to appellant because there was no specific
demand made by a third party on appellant that he escape.
This approach was adopted by this Court in
State v. Pearson,

15 U.2d 353, 393 P.2d 390 (1964).

In

Pearson an inmate, after being assaulted on several
occasions by other inmates, escaped from prison purportedly
to avoid further attacks.

The defendant was convicted

of escape, and appealed the decision, claiming that the
trial court erred in failing to submit the defense of
compulsion to the jury.

This Court held under the then

existing statute that the defense of compulsion was
inapplicable where the other inmates did not order him
to escape.
In 1973, the Utah legislature passed Utah Code
Ann. § 76-2-302 (1953), as amended, which provides:
(1)
A person is not guilty of an offense
when he engaged in the proscribed conduct
because he was coerced to do so by the use
or threatened imminent use of unlawful
physical force upon him or a third person,
which force or threatened force a person
of reasonable firmness in his situation
would not have resisted.
Section 76-2-302 follows the traditional view of the
defense of compulsion in that a person will not be guilty
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of a crime if he was coerced to commit the crime by the
use, or the threatened inuninent use, of physical force.
There is no reason to believe that the legislature, in
passing this statute, intended to extend the defense of
compulsion to escapes from prison where the escapee was
not ordered to escape with a concurrent threat of serious
bodily injury or death if he refused.

To allow the defense

of compulsion to be raised under these circumstances
would impose a substantial risk on society.

Prisoners

would be less fearful of the consequences of escaping if
they knew they could raise the defense of compulsion even
though they had not actually been ordered to escape.
Therefore, respondent submits that_the trial court
~

properly ruled that the defense of compulsion was inapplicable
in the instant case because appellant was not ordered to
escape by the other prisoners (T.260).
Appellant in his brief cites a series of cases
that have rejected the approach taken by this Court in
Pearson and have held that the defense of compulsion may
be applicable to escapes made by prisoners to avoid being
attacked.

There are two lines of cases cited by appellant.

Representative of the first line is People v. Lovercamp,
118 Cal.Rptr. 110 (1974).

In Lovercamp the court listed
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five prerequisites, which had to be met before the court
would be required to submit the defense of compulsion to
the jury.

Representative of the second line of cases is

People v. Luther, 232 N.W.2d 184 (Michiaan 1975) and
Esquebel v. State, 576 P.2d 1129 (N.M. 1978).

In these

cases the courts held that if the defendant made a prima
facie showing of compulsion, the defense should be submitted
to the jury, even though the prerequisites listed in
Lovercamp had not been met.

Respondent submits that the

facts of the instant case do not meet either of the above.
standards, and a refusal under either to submit the defense
to the jury would have been proper.
In Lovercamp, supra, the court,
concerned about
...
the potential abuse·of the defense of compulsion by escapees,
very narrowly delineated the situations in which the defense
could be raised.

The court speaking of duress as necessity,

held that the defense would be applicable only if the
following five prerequisites were met:
(1)
The prisoner is faced with a specific
threat of death, forcible sexual attack or
substantial bodily injury in the inunediate
future;
(2)
There is no time for a complaint to
the authorities or there exists a history of
futile complaints which make anv result from
such complaints illusory;
(3)
There is no opportunity to resort to
the courts;

-a-
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(4)
There is no evidence of force or
violence used towards prison personnel
or other "innocent" persons in the escape~
and
(5)
The prisoner irrunediately reports to
the proper autnorities when he has attained
a position of safety from the irrunediate
threat.
Id. at 115.
This position was follo~ed by the United States
Supreme Court in United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 380, 62
L.E.2d 575, 100 S.Ct. 624 (1980).

The defendants in Bailey

excaped from a District of Columbia jail and remained at
large for a period ranging from one month to three and a
half months.

On appeal from their conviction for escape

the Supreme Court held that, where a defendant
escape claims the defense of

compulsio~

charge~

with

he must proffer

evidence of a bona fide effort to surrender or return to
custody.

The court also listed as an indespensible element

of the defense of compulsion the fact that the threat of
harm which provoked the escape must be imminent, and the
defense will fail if the defendant fails to take advantage
of a reasonable legal alternative.
Application of the facts of the case to the
standard set out in Lovercamp and Bailey establishes that
the judge properly refused to submit the defense of compulsion
to the jury.

First, at the time of the escape there was no
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threat of physical force being imposed on appellant (T.186,
228,250).

Appellant testified that during the period

following the attack he was threatened with injury if he
reported the incident to the officials, but beyond this
there is no evidence that any other inmates intended to
injure appellant.

General threats of injury, to occur

at some unspecified time in the future, would not justify
escape under Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-302, or under the
Lovercamp standard because the threat was not imminent.
Appellant also failed to meet the second
prerequisite of taking a reasonable legal alternative to
escape.

While appellant claimed that he asked to be sent

to minimum security, the making of this request alone
clearly would not meet this requirement.

The request is

equally explainable for other reasons such as mere desire
for less restrictive custody.

Moreover, minimum security

would in fact, provide greater potential exposure to attack
because of the reduced level of custody and control.
Petitioner also failed to officially report the attack.
He did not ask to be placed in protective custody, nor
to be transferred to maximum security.

Had he done this

his problem may have been resolved without the need for
escape.
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Finally, appellant failed to meet the third
requirement of reporting to the proper authorities once
he escaped from prison.

In this case, appellant had been

out of prison for fot.rr ·hour5::when he was apprehended.

Durinq

this time he made no attempt to contact the authorities.
Further, when the police arrived on the scene he did not
qo to them and explain the situation; instead he tried to
elude the police by hidinq from them (T.266).

Respondent

submits that appellant should not benefit from the fact
that he was quickly apprehended, by claiming that he
intended to call the authorities, but did not get a chance.
Appellant has also cited a second line of ·cases
which has taken an approach different than that of Lovercamp
and Bailey.

Representative of this line of cases is People

v. Luther, 232 N.W.2d l84 (Michigan 1975).

The court in

Luther held that the defense of compulsion should be
submitted to the jury if from the evidence presented by
the defendant the jury could conclude:
(a)
The threatening conduct was
sufficient to create in the mind of a
reasonable person the fear of death or
serious bodily harm;
(b)
The conduct in fact c~used sue~
fear of death or serious bodily harm in
the mind of the defendant;
(c)
The fear or duress was operating
upon the mind of the defendant at the
time of the alleged act; and
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(d)
The defendant conunitted the act
to avoid the threatened harm.
Id. at 187 ..
Even under the approach taken in Luther the
trial court in the instant case was justified in not
submitting the defense of compulsion to the

jur~

Appellant

in this case failed to establish that the fear of injury
was operating on his mind when he made his escape.

The

facts show that appellant and Mr. Harding went into a
visiting room in the prison to set up chairs for a meeting
(T.228).

In the room they encountered Mr. Gentry, who

told them a door leading out of the pr is on was open..
three went out the door and escaped.

The

Appellant testified

that at the time of his escape he was still very fearful,
and that he acted out of fear ·in escaping.

However, at

the time the escape was made no one was in the room
threatening appellant, nor did appellant produce any evidence to show that he was subject to an inuninent threat of
attack.

The evidence presented only established that he

had purportedly been warned by other inmates that reprisals
would be taken if he reported the stabbing.

Respondent

submits that there was only a general threat of attack,
which might occur somtime in the future, and therefore,
appellant did not establish that at the time of his escape
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there was threatening conduct by other inmates sufficient
to create in the mind of a reasonable person the fear of
death or serious harm.
In conclusion, respondent submits application
of the facts of the instant case to any of the above
approaches establishes that the trial court did not err
in refusing to submit the defense of compulsion to the
jury.

Moreover, the determination of whether the defense

should have been submitted to the jury should properly
be decided under Pearson, 15 U.2d 353, 393 P.2d 390 (1964).
In the alternative respondent submits that of the two
alternate approaches, the process taken by courts in
Lovercamp and Bailey is the better reasoned approach.
Bailey recognizes the risk to s?ciety in allowing this
defense to be raised by escaped prisoners and provides
certain safeguards to limit those risks.

In addition, the

approach taken by the Supreme Court in Bailey is more in
line with the approach taken by this Court in Pearson.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO
GRANT A CONTINUANCE, AND COMPEL THE
TESTIMONY OF MR. CHAVEZ.
During the course of the trial, appellant
requested a continuance in order to locate Mr. Chavez to
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testify as a defense witness regarding the earlier stabbing.
The trial judge denied the request on the basis that the
testimony would be cumulative (T.275).

Appellant's

right to present competent evidence at trial is subject
to the trial judge's discretion to exclude admissible
evidence if the judge finds that the probative value of the
evidence is substantially outweighed by the risk that its
admission will cause any of the following problems:
(a)
necessitate undue consumption of
time, or (b) create substantial danger
of undue prejudice or of, confusing the
issues or of misleading the jury, or
(c) unfairly and harmfully surprise a
party who has not had reasonable
opportunity to anticipate that such
evidence would be offered.
Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
In this case, numerous witnesses testified that
appellant had been stabbed, and that he was fearful of
further violence after the incident occurred (T.193,209,
222,248).

Appellant sought to have Mr. Chavez testify

to further corroborate the fact that appellant had been
stabbed (T.256).

In view of the fact that it had been

firmly established that appellant had been stabbed the
probative value of this additional testimony was outweighed
by the risk that a great deal of time would be consumed
in granting a continuance to secure the presence of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization-1~provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Mr. Chavez at trial.

Therefore, the evidence was properly

excluded as cumulative.
However, even if the exclusion of Mr. Chavez's
testimony was error this would not be a basis for a
reversal of appellants conviction.

Rule 5 of the Utah

Rules of Evidence provides:
A verdict or finding shall not be set
aside, nor shall the judgment or decision
based thereon be reversed, by reason of
the erroneous exclusion of evidence unless
(a) it appears of record that the proponent
of the evidence either made known the substance of the evidence in a form and by a
method approved by the judge, or ·indicated
the substance of the expected evidence by
questions indicating the desired answers,
and (b) the court which passes upon the
effect of the error or· errors is of the
opinion that the excluded evidence would
probably have had a substantial influence
in bringing· about a different verdict or
finding.
In the instant case the trial court properly ruled that
the defense of compulsion was inapplicable in this case.
Even if Mr. Chavez's testimony had been admitted it would
have been stricken with the rest of the testimony regarding
the defense of compulsion.

Therefore, the evidence would

not have had a substantial influence in bringing about a
different verdict.
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POINT III
THE PETITIONER RECEIVED HIS SIXTH
AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO A PUBLIC TRIAL
BECAUSE THE CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFIED
CLOSING THE COURTROOM.
The right to a public trial is guaranteed to
a criminal defendant in the Sixth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and in Article I, Section 12 of the
Utah Constitution.

However, the right to a public trial

is not absolute, nor is it a "limitless imperative."
Lacaze v. United States, 391 F.2d 516, 521 (5th Cir. 1968).
The purpose of the Sixth Amendment public trial requirement
is to guarantee that a defendant will be fairly dealt with
and not unjustly condemned.
92 L.Ed 682, 68 S.C.

In Re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257,

499 (1948).

An accomodation must be

made of an individual's right ·to a public trial and the
interests of society which might justify the closing of a
courtroom to the public.

United States ex rel. Lloyd v.

Vincent, 520 F.2d 1272, 1274 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 937 (1975); United States v. Eisner, 533 F.2d 987,
993 (6th Cir.) cert. denied, 429 U.S. 919 (1976).
The right to a public trial has been interpreted
as being "subject to the trial judge's power to keep order
in the courtroom" United States ex rel.. Orlando v. Fay,
350 F.2d 967 (2d Cir. 1965).

A judge has the inherent
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power to preserve order and decorum in the courtroom,
and in the exercise of that power he may remove spectators
from the courtroom without infringing on an accused's
right to a public trial.

United States v. Kolbi, 172

F.2d 919 (3rd Cir. 1949).

The trial judge in a criminal

case, upon the development of a situation indicating that
armed or open violence may be attempted against those
participating in the trial, may take necessary precautions
to avoid such situations.

People v. Santo, 43 Cal.2d 319,

273 P.2d 249 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 959 (1955).
In People v. Jones, 157 Cal.Rptr. 51 (1979), the judge
in a juvenile proceeding

ordere~

a search of the defendant

to be made based on information that had been communicated
to him by the court baliff.

A social worker had told the

baliff that during an interview she had had with the
defendant he had brandished a gun and threatened to kill
anyone who tried to take his child.

During the search a

small dagger was found on the defendant.
In a subsequent proceeding the defendant was tried
for carrying a concealed weapon.

In this proceeding the

defendant challenged the right of the trial court to make
the search.

The Supreme court of California held:

[t]he superior court had both the
statutory and inherent power (see
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Hawk v. Superior Court, 42 Cal.App.3d
108, 126-127, 116 Cal.Rptr. 713 [cert.
den., 421 U.S. 1012, 95 S.Ct. 2417, 44
L.Ed.2d 680]), and duty, "'to preserve
the order of the court and to see to it
that all persons . • indulge in no act
or conduct calculated to obstruct the
administration of justice'" (People v.
Merkouris, 46 Cal.2d 540, 556, 297 P.2d
999, 1010), and "to take whatever steps
were necessary to see that no conduct
on the part of any person obstructed
the administration of justice" (People
v. Santo, 43 Cal.2d 319, 331, 273 P.2d
2 4 9 1 2 5 6 [cert. den. , 3 4 8 U.S. 9 5 9, 7 5
S.Ct. 451, 99 L.Ed. 749]).
That power
and duty patently extended to the
prevention of threatened courtroom violence reported, as here, bv an officer
of the court of her own knowledge.
Id. at 53

;n_United Stat?s v. Eisner, supra, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals reviewed the propriety of excluding spectators
from the courtroom

d~ring

the testimony of a government witness

because of her fear of testifying before those present in the
courtroom.
court.

This fear could not be substantiated by the trial

Nevertheless, the courtroom was cleared and the trial

court's order was upheld by the appellate court.

The appellate

court noted that the purpose of a public trial was to guarantee
fairness but that this right was not absolute, and that a
balancing of interests might justify closing of the courtroom.
The court then stated, "The propriety of the trial court's
action depends on the particular circumstances of the case."
533 F. 2d 993.

See Aaron v. Capps, 507 F. 2d 68 5 (5th Cir.) cert
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denied, 423 U.S. 878 (1975); Snyder v. Coiner, 510 F.2d 224
{4th Cir. 197 5) •
The exclusion of the public either in whole or in
part has been ruled constitutionally acceptable where closed
proceedings were determined to be necessary in order to preserve
order and protect the defendant or witnesses.

In United States

ex rel. Smallwood v. LaValle, 377 F.Supp. 1148 (E.D.M.Y.), aff'd
without opinion 508 F.2d 837 {2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 920 (1975), the trial court did not deny the accused a fair
and public trial where the trial courtts order excluding spectators from the courtroom was based partly on its concern for
the state's witness and her

unb~rn

child and partly on her

subjective fear of retaliation if she publicly testified.

The

record, significantly, did not establish a real danger to the
witness' health or to the health of the child or the reasonableness of her fears in terms of actual threats received.

In

Butler v. Smith, 416 F.Supp. 1151 (D.C.N.Y. 1976), the
temporary exclusion of the public from the court during the
testimony of two of the state's minor witnesses during a
murder trial did not violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to a public trial.

The exclusion was to protect the

witnesses who were found to have a sincere fear of reprisal
if they testified.

In United States ex rel. Lloyd v. Vincent,
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520 F.2d 1272 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975),
the defendant was not denied his right to a public trial by
the exclusion of the public during the testimony of undercover agents in order to maintain the secrecy of the
identities of the agents.

The appellate court determined

that it was within the trial court's power to make a
finding that exclusion was required on the basis of his
judicial knowledge of the role of undercover agents even
if the,better course would have been a hearing.
Mr. Gentry, who was convicted with Mr. Harding
and Appellant, appealed his conviction in State v. Gentry,
No. 16757 (Utah June 19, 1980) '· (Appendix A), raising this
same issue that he was denied his right to a public trial.
This Court rejected his claim stating:
No one as yet successfully has contended,
as the appellant seems to do here, that the
Sixth Amendment's interdiction is applicable
under any conceivable circumstances, and its
language never was intended to protect any
right to subject a magistrate to ignore a
reasonable or even possible danger of personal
harm or disruption of the dignity of his
courtroom.
The mere fact that appellant was
a known escapee at a prior time, of itself
should warrant exclusion of the public, if
for no other reason than the spectators
themselves might suffer harm or even death
in an escape that a judge may have reason to
believe may eventuate.
After Mr. Gentry's conviction was confirmed by this Court,
he petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ
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of certiorari.
10 0 S • Ct.

His petition was denied in Gentry v. Utah,

( 19 81) •

In the petitioner's case, the trial judge
ordered the courtroom closed in the afternoon of the final
day of trial (T.224,245).

After the courtroom was closed,

Mr. Harding and Mr. Purcell testified.

The judge stated

that the courtroom had been closed because the court had
received information from a social worker at the prison,
via the Murray Police Department, that the defendants would
try to escape during the proceedings (T.258).
Pursuant to the judge's duty to insure the
orderly administration of

justi~e

and to protect the

defendants, witnesses and members of the general public in
attendance at the trial, and to_ prevent the possibility of
violence, he exercised his right to exclude the public from
the courtroom.
The trial judge could reasonably have believed that
there was a clear danger not only of an escape attempt by
appellant, but also the possibility of harm to members of
the public, the defendant, and to witnesses if such an
attempt should occur.

It was entirely possible that if

such an escape attempt was made, a spectator could have
been taken hostage.

It is equally likely that accomplices

would be present in the courtroom to aid in the attempt.
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The proceedings in petitioner's case were closed
for a minimal duration since the closure did not take place
until the trial was almost over and at that time it was
closed only to the extent necessary to prevent an escape.
The trial judge, in a careful effort to prevent any prejudice
to the defendant refrained from informing the jury of any
likelihood of an escape.

The jury was not told that the

doors had been locked and there was no evidence of a
secret, coercive atmosphere.
At trial appellant made no request for a pre-closure
hearing.

He voiced only a general objection to the exclusion

of the public from the courtroom (T.258).

Nevertheless

appellant cites People v. Jones, 47 N.Y.2d 409, 391 N.E.2d
1335 (N.Y.App. 1979)', claiming that the courts failure to
hold a hearing to determine the reliability of the information
received denied him his right to a public trial.

Respondent

would point out that the position taken by the New York
court in Jones is not constitutionally mandated, nor are
there any such requirements in the Utah Constitution, Utah
statutes or Utah case law.

Furthermore, other courts

have rejected the claim that an evidentiary hearing must
be held before a courtroom may be closed.
In United States v. Hernandez, 608 F.2d 741
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(9th Cir. 1979) , the appellate court stated that while
the "better course" i's to hold an evidentiary
·
hearing on
the matter, the trial court's order to clear the courtroom
for a limited portion of the trial should be upheld where
there was a reasonable basis to conclude that the safety
of certain witnesses might be in jeopardy, 608 F.2d 747748.

In United States ex rel. Lloyd v. Vincent, 520 F.2d

1272 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975), the
appellate court upheld the trial court's order to exclude
the public solely on the basis of the prosecutor's asserted
need for confidentiality of undercover agents; the appellate
court determined that it was within the trial court's
power to make a finding that exclusion was required based
on the trial judge's judicial knowledge of the role of
undercover agents.
The circumstances in this case also justified
the closing of the courtroom.

The trial judge, on the

basis of his judicial knowledge of the dangers inherent in
escape attempts, justifiably closed the trial to the public
for a short period of time to prevent an escape and to
protect the public, witnesses, and the appellant himself
from what could have been a dangerous situation.

The fact

that other alternatives could have been used by the trial
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judge does not make his actions improper.

Respondent

submits that the trial court did not abuse its inherent
discretionary powers to prevent interference with orderly
courtroom procedures by closing the courtroom in appellant's
case.
POINT IV
APPELLANT WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY THE
CLOSING OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Appellant cites State v. Jordan, 57 Ut 612, 146
P. 565 (1921), which held that, if a defendant is denied
his right to a public trial, prejudice is presumed.
Respondent submits that this does not mean that a violation
of a defendant's right to a public trial is prejudicial
per se, but that the error can be overcome when this Court
is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had
no prejudicial effect upon the proceedings.
Scandrett, 24 U.2d 202, 468 P.2d 639 (1970).

State v.
In Scandrett

this Court stated:
There are two differing views as
to the effect of error in violating a
constitutional right.
On the one hand it
is sometimes stated that the violation of
such a right should be deemed prejudicial
per se; [footnote omitted] and on the other,
that it may depend upon the circumstances.
The first proposition has the frailty of
most generalities. Simply that it is not
universally true.
There are certainly
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conceivable circumstances where the
violation of a constitutional right
could ha~e no possible bearing upon
any unfairness or imposition upon the
defendant, or upon a correct determination of his guilt or innocence.
We think the correct view, and the
one which is both practical and in
keeping with the desired objective
of fundamental fairness and due process
of law, is that there is a presumption
that such error is prejudicial, but that
it can be overcome when the court is
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt
that it had no such prejudicial effect
upon the proceedings. [footnote omitted]
Correlative to this it is also true that
when the guilt is shown by other untainted
evidence so overwhelming that there is no
likelihood whatsoever of a different
result in the absence of such error or
irregularity, there should be no reversal.
[footnote omitted] To reverse under either
of such circumstances' results in the
distortion of the processes of justice
and the unnecessary proliferation of
legal proceedings.
Id. at 643.
In the instant case the courtroom was closed
during the afternoon of the last day of trial.

After the

courtroom was closed, the only testimony received was from
Mr. Hardy and Mr. Purcell.

Their testimony covers

approximately 13 pages of transcript (T.247-255 and T.263-

267).

Therefore, the proceedings were closed for a very

short period of time towards the end of the trial.

The

trial judge was careful not to prejudice the jury by
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discussing the reasons for closing the courtroom in
front of them (T.245,258}.

Respondent submits that

even if, arguendo, appellant was denied his right to
a public trial his conviction should not be reversed
because he was not prejudiced.
CONCLUSION
Appellant has failed to raise any issues which
would justify the reversal of his conviction.
First, the trial court properly ruled that the
defense of compulsion did not apply to the facts presented
in this case.

This Court has held that the defense of

compulsion is only applicable where a person is ordered
to engage in proscribed conduct with a concurrent threat
of injury if he fails to obey. · In this case appellant
was not ordered to escape.

Therefore, the defense is

inapplicable.
Appellant has cited a number of cases which have
not taken the approach taken by this Court.

However, the

defense of compulsion would be inapplicable even under the
standards set forth in these cases.
Under the Lovercamp line of cases appellant must
show that he was faced with a specific threat of bodily
injury in the immediate future, that he made attempts to
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take advantage of legal alternatives, and that he immediately
reported to officials once the escape was effectuated.
Appellant did not meet any of these prerequisites.

Under

the Luther line of cases defendant must make out a prima
facie showing of compulsion before the defense will be
submitted to the jury.

In the instant case appellant

failed to make this showing because he did not establish
that at the time of his escape there was any imminent
threat working on his mind that caused him to escape.
Therefore, appellant has failed to show that the defense of
compulsion is applicable to the instant case under either
of these standards.
Second, the fact that the testimony of Al Chavez
was excluded is not a basis for reversal of appellant's
conviction.

The trial judge has the discretion to exclude

admissible evidence if the probative value of the evidence
is outweighed by the risk that the admission of the
evidence would consume too much time.

In the instant

case the probative value of admitting cumulative evidence
was outweighed by the risk that to much time would have
been consumed by granting a continuance.

Moreover, if error

occurred, it was harmless.
Third, appellant was not denied his right to a
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public trial.

The information received by the court

that the defendants were planning an escape justified the
closing of the courtroom in order to prevent interference
with orderly courtroom procedures.

However, assuming

that appellant was denied his right to a public trial,
his conviction should not be reversed because he was not
prejudiced.
Respectfully submitted,
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
At~orneys
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